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A Territorial Approach to Representation for Illegal Aliens
The decennial census determines each state's population for the
purpose of apportioning seats in the House of Representatives. 1 Because the Census Bureau counts illegal aliens along with all other
"persons,"2 states with significant illegal alien3 populations will enjoy greater representation in relation to registered voters or legal inhabitants than will states without such alien populations. This Note
addresses the issue of whether the Constitution permits, requires, or
leaves to congressional discretion the inclusion of undocumented
aliens in the "persons" counted to apportion representatives among
the states.
While this issue is not new, 4 recent efforts to alter the apportionment of representatives to reflect population exclusive of undocumented aliens have renewed constitutional scrutiny of the proposed
I. "Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their re•
spective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not
taxed." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. The census figures also are used to allocate votes in the
Electoral College, and to appropriate federal funds. See U.S. CONST. art. II,§ I, cl. 2; Note,
Numbers that Count: The Law and Policy ofPopulation Statistics Used in Formula Gran/ A/lo•
cation Programs, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 229 (1980).
2. Census Bureau procedures are dictated by statute, 13 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1976). Section
14l(b) contemplates counting all persons:
The tabulation of totalpopulation by States under subsection (a) of this section as required
far the apportionment ofRepresentatives in Congress among the several States shall be com•
pleted within 9 months after the census date and reported by the Secretary to the President of the United States
13 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1976) (emphasis added). The only persons presently not counted by design
are diplomats and foreign tourists. The former reside on embassy grounds which are considered foreign soil and, therefore, not part of any state; the latter do not reside here at all. Feder•
ation for Am. Immigration Reform (FAIR) v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564,567 (D.D.C. 1980).
3. The term ''undocumented alien" is more accurate than "illegal alien" in that it describes
either those who have entered the country without proper documentation or those who have
remained in the country beyond the expiration date of their immigration documents. As used
in this Note, illegal alien means an undocumented alien.
4. In 1940, when Congress was amending an act that provided for the fifteenth and subsequent decennial censuses, the issue of counting resident aliens was raised and argued on the
floor. See 86 CONG. REc. 4366-85 (1940). The discussion was aimed at documented aliens.
Representatives then seemed to accept the argument that aliens as persons could not be excluded without a constitutional amendment. Consider the remarks of Representative Celler of
New York:
The Constitution says that all persons shall be counted. I cannot quarrel with the founding fathers. They said that all should be counted. We count the convicts who are just as
dangerous and just as bad as the Communists or the Nazis, as those aliens here illegally,
and I would not come here and have the temerity to say that the convicts shall be excluded, if the founding fathers say they shall be included. The only way we can exclude
them would be to pass a constitutional amendment.
Id. at 4372 (Rep. Cellar). See also id. at 4367 (Rep. Warren).
The statute under consideration, originally passed in 1929, provided for the census and for
automatic reapportionment in the event that Congress did not act within a specified time. The
President was to transmit the census results. The twentieth amendment, enacted in 1933, altered the date for Congress's second session and advanced the inauguration of the President,
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changes. Recently Congress specifically discussed counting illegal
aliens,5 and opponents of their exclusion again argued that such a
policy would violate the Constitution.6 The courts as well as the legislature ha,ve confronted this issue of including illegal aliens in the
census.7 The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR)
brought suit to enjoin the Census Bureau from including, without
adjustment, illegal aliens in the population figures. 8 Although dismissed for lack of standing, the action raises some interesting constitutional questions on the merits.
FAIR raised two principal arguments to support its claim that
allocating representatives on the basis of census data that count illegal aliens violates the Constitution. First, FAIR contended that the
rendering the time limits of the 1929 act no longer workable. The primary purpose of the new
bill therefore was to amend the act to conform with the new congressional schedule.
The House Committee had included a provision excluding aliens from the population
totals. The bill in this form passed in the Senate; yet the House version did not include this
provision. Id. at 4367. The discussion about aliens was prompted by the missing provision.
The bill was passed with no reference to aliens. Id. at 4386.
From 1929 to 1947, various members of both the House and Senate introduced what appears to have been the same constitutional amendment, which would have provided for apportionment based on citizen population. See, e.g., 62 CONG. REc. 490 (1929); 67 CONG. REc.
455 (1925); 71 CONG. REc. 33 (1929); 75 CONG. REc. 2453-54 (1932); 78 CONG. REc. 6637-41
(1934); 84 CONG. REC. 1003 (1939); 87 CONG. REc. 465 (1941); 93 CONG. REc. 718 (1947)
(Rep. Capper claiming he had been trying for 25 years to get the amendment submitted to the
states). Each time the amendment was referred to committee; it was never voted on. After
1947 interest in the amendment seems to have disappeared.
5. See 126 CoNG. REc. H7263-72 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1980). The debate concerned the
McDade amendment which sought to block the funds needed to certify the census figures and
transfer them to the President. Id. at H7263. Representative McDade was a plaintiff in FAIR
v. K{utznick, id. at H7264, and his amendment was aimed indirectly at the illegal alien issue.
6. Id. at H7266 (Rep. Garcia), H7269 (Rep. Leach), H7271 (Rep. Clinger). Rep. McDade,
however, believed that a constitutional amendment was unnecessary. Id. at H7266. The McDade amendment passed in the House on August 20, 1981, 222 votes to 189. The bill was
ineffective in keeping the census figures from being transmitted. Since the McDade Amendment says nothing about illegal aliens, it is hard to regard it as a definitive expression of congressional interpretation of the census clause. There is also a good argument that the McDade
Amendment itself was unconstitutional because it sought to delay the census beyond the tenyear period required in article I, section 2.
Earlier in the year, five separate bills requiring that the census exclude illegal aliens were
introduced. See 126 CONG. REc. HI 199 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1980) (H.R. 6577 by Rep. Jeffords),
S1976 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1980) (S. 2366 by Senators Huddleston and Heinz), HL549 (daily ed.
Mar. 4, 1980) (H. Res. 594 by Rep. Clinger), H1766, Hl782 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1980) (H.R.
6769 by Rep. Hillis), Hl898 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1980) (H.R. 6812 by Rep. Grassley). None of
the bills were voted on.
7. Federation for American Immigration Reform v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C.)
(three-judge court), appeal dismissed, 447 U.S. 916, ajfd by judgment, No. 80-1246 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 6, 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Federation for American Immigration Reform v. Baldridge (sic), 101 S. Ct. 1697 (1981) (hereinafter FAIR v. Klutznick).
8. The short census form, which was to be sent to 80% of households, included no questions about citizenship. The long form, which was to be sent to the remaining households,
included questions about citizenship but did not provide a means of differentiating documented from undocumented aliens. 486 F. Supp. at 567 n.4. FAIR also argued that the Bureau, in an effort to increase the probability of counting the entire population, had actively
encouraged illegal aliens to respond to the census. 486 F. Supp. at 567 n.S.
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introductory phrase in the original article I, section 2, "People of the
Several States," refers to lawful residents only. 9 FAIR reasoned that
because the United States did not adopt its first immigration law until 1875, seven years after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment,10 the framers of both the original and amended census clauses
could have had no intent regarding illegal aliens. 11 The census
clause, therefore, does not prevent the courts from interpreting it to
exclude the illegal alien population.
Second, FAIR argued that the "one person, one vote" 12 standard
applied by the Supreme Court to intrastate congressional districting
requires exclusion of illegal aliens. FAIR claimed that three to eight
million illegal aliens, 13 concentrated in a few states, would cause a
disproportionate allotment of representatives to those states. 14 This
would dilute the voting power of citizens in states without a significant illegal population, and cause those citizens to "receive a lesser
share" of federal funds. 15 This result, FAIR contended, would contravene the "one person, one vote" standard set by the Supreme
Court.
This Note rejects these arguments in favor of the thesis that the
census clause affirmatively requires including illegal aliens in the
census figures used to apportion representatives among the states.
Part I argues that the framers intended to allocate representation
among the states based on a number of considerations, including
wealth, and chose total population within the territory of each state
as the best measure of those considerations. Part II contends that the
requirement of individual equality in voting rights does not apply to
interstate comparisons of voting power. Rather, a specific structural
agreement reached by the states as sovereign entities governs the allocation of representation among them. Part III argues that while
the question of counting illegal aliens in the census presents numerous technical and political issues subject to congressional discretion,
9. Brief for Appellants at 18, 20, FAIR v. K.lutznick, No. 80-1246 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (copy on
file with The Michigan Law Review).
10. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (1875). See M. KONVITZ, THE ALIEN AND
THE AsIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW 1-2 (1946).
11. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 9, at 18-20.
12. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964).
13. 486 F. Supp. at 567. The estimates of the illegal alien population in the past ten years
range from 3.5 to 12 million. Recent Census Bureau estimates place the figure at less than 6
million and probably as low as 3.5 million. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1980, at Al2, col. 4. In
1974 the Immigration and Naturalization Service estimated that there were 6 to 12 million
illegal aliens in the country. See Salinas & Torres, The Undocumented Mexican Alien, 13
Hous. L. REv. 863, 866 (1976). In 1975, Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, wrote that the actual number was probably between 6
and 8 million. See Chapman,A Look at Illegal Immigration: Causes and Impact on the United
States, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 34, 35 (1975).
14. 486 F. Supp. at 565-66.
15. 486 F. Supp. at 586. See also note 1 supra.
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the essential constitutional issues concern the interpretation of article
I, section 2, especially the definition of "person." These issues ultimately lie within the purview of the Supreme Court.

I. THE MEANING OF THE

CENSUS CLAUSE

The conclusion that the census clause16 requires apportionment
of representatives according to population data that include illegal
aliens follows from the constitutional language, the light cast on its
original intent by its structure and history, and by the reaffirmation
of these considerations in the fourteenth amendment. These concerns strongly suggest that the framers adopted a territorial, rather
than popular, approach to representation in the Hous~ as well as the
Senate. This territorial model implies that the states enjoy a constitutional right to representation based on the number of "persons" illegal aliens included - within their borders.
A. The Constitutional Language

The language of the census clause provides a starting point for
determining its meaning. 17 This language "is not ambiguous"; 18 it
requires "adding the whole Number of free Persons . . . ." 19 illegal
aliens, although "not a component of the population at the time the
Constitution was adopted, . . . are clearly persons."20
Any distinction between undocumented aliens and "persons"
must depend upon the legal status of the former. Other distinctions
lead to contradictions. If illegal aliens do not qualify as legal persons, their transformation through naturalization into citizens, for
example, can occur only if personhood, like citizenship, is a legal
category rather than an inherent attribute. The contention that illegal aliens exist wholly outside the law because their very presence
violates the immigration laws21 offers such a legal distinction. illegal
16. Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned amoni the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which
shall be determined by adding the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound
to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other
Persons••.•
U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 2, cl 3.
11. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202 (1819) (Marshall. CJ.)
("[A]lthough the spirit of an instrument, especially of a constitution, is to be respected not less
than its letter, yet the spirit is to be collected chiefly from its words."). And while strict literalism does not dominate accepted modes of constitutional analysis, even those who view the
Constitution as a vehicle for the legal expression of contemporary values treat ''the text and
original history as presumptively binding and limiting, but as neither a necessary nor sufficient
condition for constitutional decisionmaking." Brest, The Misconceived Quest far the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 237 (1980) (footnote omitted).
18. FAIR v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. at 576.
19. See note 16, supra.
20. FAIR v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. at 576.
21. For this argument in the equal protection context, ~ Burrafato v. United States Dept.
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aliens, according to this argument, enjoy precisely the same status
under United States law as they would have had they remained in
their country of origin, that is, no status at all. Litigants have raised
this argument in various attempts to deny illegal aliens access to the
courts and the protection of the law.22
Three related objections render the outlaw approach unpersuasive. First, considerable authority has rejected this view in other
contexts. The Supreme Court has repeatedly included aliens among
the "persons" protected by the due process clause of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, 23 even when their presence is illegal.24
Lower federal courts have upheld the personhood of illegal aliens for
both due process and equal protection purposes. In .Doe v. Plyler, 25
the court held that while violation of the immigration laws could
give rise to some disabilities imposed by the federal government and
that plaintiffs' status as aliens could support their exclusion from
participation in governmental functions within the state, no precedent permits the states to impose other disabilities based only on a
violation of the immigration laws.26 In Williams v. Williams, 27 a federal district court found no relationship between a violation of the
immigration laws and a divorce action and held that denying an
alien access to the divorce court based on undocumented status
of State, 523 F.2d 554,551 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976), and Hernandez v.
Houston Ind. School Dist., 558 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), cited in Comment,
Equal Protection and the Education of Undocumented Childrfn, 34 Sw. L.J. 1229, 1234 n.34
(1981). See also Comment, The Legal Status of Undocumented Aliens: In Search ofa Consistent Theory, 16 Hous. L. REv. 667, 695-96 (1979) (comparing the outlaw approach of the
Hemandez court with the analysis of Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978)),
22. See Comment, The Legal Status of Undocumented Aliens, SUJJra note 21, at 670-71.
23. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33,
48-51 (1950); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886):
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens. It says: 'Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the law.' These provisions are universal in their application to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or nationality;
and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.
24. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896), holding that while Congress may exclude and expel aliens at its discretion, and order their detention toward those
ends, it cannot punish the crime of illegal entry without meeting the due process standards set
by the fifth and sixth amendments. The Court declared:
Applying this reasoning [of Yick WoJ to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, it must be
concluded that all persons within the territory of the United State are entitled to the protection guaranteed by those amendments, and that even aliens shall not be held to answer
for a capital or other infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
25. 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980). For discussion see note 29 i'!fra.
26. 628 F.2d at 458. The court also pointed out that illegal entry is only a misdemeanor for
the first commission. While this is irrelevant to the outlaw argument per se, it does demonstrate how disproportionate the disability would be in relation to the offense, if the outlaw
approach prevailed.
27. 328 F. Supp. 1380 (D.V.I. 1971).
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would violate constitutional guarantees of due process and .equal
protection.28 While these decisions do not specifically concern the
census clause, they strongly support including illegal aliens in any
constitutional definition of personhood.29
Second, the outlaw approach defies consistent application. Both
the state and federal governments subject illegal aliens to their jurisdiction for purposes of imposing certain obligations, such as the duty
to pay taxes or obey the criminal law. If justice requires treating like
cases alike, 30 excluding illegal aliens from legal protections and benefits constitutes a paradigm case of injustice, for such an arrangement treats the same individual as a person for purposes of burdening
him and as a nonperson for purposes of protecting him.
Finally, and most profoundly, allowing the government to statutorily deny disfavored groups the status of persons would permit the
evisceration-by-definition of the Constitution's most important protections of individual rights. Subjecting personhood, like citizenship,
to changes in legal status would empower political majorities to determine the scope of provisions that arose from the very fear of the
abuse of majority power.31 Important as it is, a proper allocation of
28. 328 F. Supp. at 1383.
29. The Supreme Court will decide this term whether illegal aliens are entitled to equal
protection under the Constitution. Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), and Boe v.
Wright, 648 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1981), U.S. appealpending sub nom. Texas v. Certain Named &
Unnamed Noncitizen Children (No. 80-1934), were consolidated on appeal, 49 U.S.L.W. 3930
(No. 80-1934 June 15, 1981), and oral argument heard on December 1, 1981. If the Court
decides that illegal aliens are not covered under the equal protection clause, it will have accepted the outlaw argument in this context. Because the equal ,protection clause is phrased in
terms of "persons," this would be an unfortunate result, one that would open the possibility of
further exceptions to constitutional protection. For a discussion of "person" and its use in the
Constitution, see A. BICKEL, Citizen or Person? What is not Granted Cannot be Taken Away, in
THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 33 (1975). Even if the Court holds that illegal aliens are not
persons under the equal protection clause, it will leave open the question of whether they
should be counted as persons under the census clause. The considerations underlying the due
process, equal protection, and census clauses are distinct and the concerns that would cause the
Court to find against equal protection would not apply under the census clause. In particular,
the inclusion of illegal aliens under the census clause would not affect their eligibility for government entitlement programs.
As this Note went to press, the Supreme Court decided the case in favor of the alien children. Plyler v. Doe, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1982, § I, at 15 col. l. Although the court divided
by five votes to four, none of the justices appear to have opined that the equal protection clause
does not apply to illegal aliens. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan observed that
"[w]hatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a 'person' in any ordinary
sense of that term." Plyler v. Doe, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1982, § I, at 15 col. l. This result, of
course, reinforces the argument made in the text.
30. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155-63 (1961).
31. See A. BICKEL, supra note 29, at 53:
A relationship between government and the governed that turns on citizenship can always
be dissolved or denied. Citizenship is a legal construct, an abstraction, a theory. No
matter what the safeguards, it is at best something given, and given to some and not to
others, and it can be taken away. It has always been easier, it always will be easier, to
think of someone as a noncitizen than to decide that he is a nonperson, which is the point
of the JJred Scott case. Emphasis on citizenship as the tie that binds the individual to
government and as the source of his rights leads to metaphysical thinking about politics
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interstate representation does not merit such a risk. Consequently,
the outlaw approach should be rejected in favor of the territorial
modeP 2 mandated by the plain language of the census clause.
B. The Framers' Intent

Analyzing the _intent behind the census clause clarifies whatever
ambiguity may inhere in its language. Based on three major arguments, this Note defends the view that the intent animating the census clause strengthens the case for counting illegal aliens. First, the
framers meant to allocate representation, in the House as well as the
Senate, to the states rather than to the people as individuals. Second,
the framers intended to apportion representatives among the states
based on a combination of factors, prominently including wealth,
and chose the number of persons within each state's territory as the
measure - and not the source ~ of this political entitlement. Finally, illegal aliens measure a state's entitlement to representation as
accurately as many other persons unquestionably within the ambit of
the census clause.
1. States or Persons?
The framers conceived of representation, even in the House, as a
function of federalism. The states, and not the individuals within
them, constituted the polity to be represented. While the familiar
view that the framers intended the Senate to represent the states and
the House to represent the people does not wholly lack support,33 it
and law, and more particularly to symmetrical thinking, to a search for reciprocity and
symmetry and clarity of uncompromised rights and obligations, rationally ranged one
next to and against the other. Such thinking bodes ill for the endurance of free, flexible,
responsive, and stable institutions and of a balance between order and liberty. It is by
such thinking, as in Rousseau's The Social Contract, that the claims of liberty may be
readily translated into the postulates of oppression.
32. illegal aliens would still be subject to deportation and other rights and disabilities
would still be fashioned within Constitutional bounds. Resident aliens do not enjoy all of the
privileges afforded citizens, see, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (upholding a federal
statute denying resident aliens federal medical insurance benefits unless they met a residency
requirement); Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (upholding a state statute excluding
aliens from jobs as public school teachers). Similar and perhaps broader disabilities would be
upheld for illegal aliens.
The Court seems to provide different levels of protection under the fifth amendment and
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment for resident aliens. For an explanation of the treatment of aliens, see Karst, Foreword· Eljllal Citizens/tip Under tlte Fourteen/It
Amendment, 91 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 1, 42-46 (1977), and Karst, The F!filt Amendment's Guarantee oj'
Equal Protection, 55 N.C. L. REv. 541, 552-62 (1977).
33. See, e.g., C. ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 193 (1966). This view relies
somewhat on a statement to the Convention by Dr. Johnson:
On the whole he [Dr. Johnson] thought that as in some respects the States are to be
considered in their political capacity, and in others as districts of individual citizens, the
two ideas embraced on different sides, instead of being opposed to each other, ought to be
combined; that in one branch the people ought to be represented; in the other, the Stales.
1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 461-62 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) (hereinafter
cited as RECORDS). Madison includes several similar statements in THE FEDERALIST Nos. 39
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fails to explain as well as the competing territorial model does the
interstate conflict that gave rise to the Great Compromise, the framers' concern with representing wealth, or the discounted inclusion of
the slaves in the population base of representation.
The census clause emerged from a compromise between the competing interests and philosophies of members of the Continental
Congress.34 The primary conflict involved whether the states would
be represented in the legislature equally or proportionately by size.35
The large states, proponents of the Virginia Plan, advocated representation in the legislature proportional to ''the Quotas of Contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule
may seem best in different cases."36 The small states, proponents of
the New Jersey Plan, urged that each state be represented equally in
the legislature, as provided under the Articles of Confederation.37
The Great Compromise established a bicameral legislature with the
Senate providing an equal number of representatives for each state
and the House providing a number of representatives for each state
proportional to its size.38
This history suggests that the framers fashioned the Great Compromise less to represent both the states and the people than to provide a mutually satisfactory system for representing the states. Had
the delegates perceived the issue as one of ideology, le., whether the
legislature should represent the people directly, a purely state-oriented division of opinion probably would not have developed. The
controversy, however, clearly split the large and small states.39 This
historical foundation of the census clause in the competing interests
oflarge and small states suggests a federal, rather than popular, view
of representation in the intentions of the framers.
at 254-55, 58 at 392, 63 at 431 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). In THE FEDERALIST No. 54, however,
Madison presents a defense of the territorial approach, less as his own view than as that of the
Convention.
34. See A. KELLY & w. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION - ITS ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT (1976); C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF nm CONSTITUTION 294 (rev. ed. 1937);
cf. A. McLAUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 141 (1961) (''The
Constitution is sometimes called a bundle of compromises; it may be more justly called the
product of adjustment.").
35. See M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF TIIE CONSTITUTION OF·THE UNITED STATES 84,
91, 96-105 (1913); C. ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 176 (1966).
36. See l RECORDS, supra note 33, at 20. The Virginia Plan provided for a legislature with
two chambers. The first chamber was ''to be elected by the people of the several states" and
the second was to be chosen by the first using the nominations provided by state legislatures.
Voting in both houses was to be proportional to population or "contribution." M. FARRAND,
supra note 35, at 68-70.
37. The New Jersey Plan was silent on the issue of representation but made its position
clear by advocating amendments to the Articles of Confederation rather than a new plan of
government. See 1 REcoRDs, supra note 33, at 242-45.
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl l; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl 3.
39. See note 35 supra.
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The founders' concern for representing wealth further supports
the federal model of representation.40 Gouverneur Morris, for example, forthrightly declared his belief that because "property . . .
was the main object of government, . . . it ought to be the measure
of the influence of those who were to be affected" by it.41 Even Dr.
William Johnson, who had urged that the House should represent
the people,42 expressed the belief that ''wealth and population were
the true, equitable rule of representation." 43 The framers solidified
this relationship of wealth and representation by making population
the measure of both representation and taxation. 44 Thus each state
would receive a number of representatives proportionate to its contribution through direct taxation to the federal government. Few, if
any, delegates quarreled with this arrangement; indeed, the framers
viewed taxation and representation as substantially interdependent.45 While few delegates believed that wealth constituted the
only basis of representation,46 the broad consensus approving a major role for property in the allocation of representatives seriously
weakens the view that the framers intended direct representation of
40. Nowhere in the discussion as far as it is recorded, did anyone urge the representation
of men as men. Be it remembered that was a new idea in the world, born only eleven
years before, in London, and not yet familiar on this side of the ocean. There can be no
shadow of question that populations were accepted as a measure of material interests landed, agricultural, industrial, commercial, in short, property. This appears in the quite
arbitrary grant of representation proportionate to three fifths of the number of slaves.
They were not to be represented because they were human beings; their owners were to be
represented in the ratio of ownership of human property. Again, only taxed Indians were
to be counted, for they alone of the red men had any property. Most convincing of all,
"representatives and direct taxes" were coupled in the paragraph providing for apportionment among the States "according to their respective numbers."
In view of all this, it would seem indisputable that citizens and aliens were not as such
in the minds of the men who wrote the Constitution nor of those who were delegates to
the ratifying conventions. Our fathers meant to apportion the membership of the House
on the basis of all who dwelt within the respective States. Property was the basis, not
humanity. Such political philosophy might not prevail to-day were the Constitution to be
written anew, but until the Constitution is changed, it must be construed as it was meant
to be construed.
R. LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PRINCIPLES 356-57 (1930). Even Madison admitted the legitimacy of
the Convention's concern for representing property. See THE FEDERALIST No. 54 (J,
Madison) 367-70 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("Government is instituted no less for protection of the
property, than of the person of individuals. The one as well as the other, therefore may be
considered as represented by those who are charged with the government.")
41. 1 REcoRDS, supra note 33, at 533.
Gouverneur Morris opposed population as the basis of representation because he felt it did
not accurately reflect property, see l RECORDS, supra note 33, at 582.
42. See l RECORDS, supra note 33, at 461-62 (Dr. Johnson).
43. Id. at 593.
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cL 3.
:45, See THE FEDERALIST, No. 54 (J. Madison) 366-67 (J. Cooke ed. 1961); 1 RECORDS,
supra note 33, at 562.
46. See Rossum, Representation and Republican Government: Contemporary Court Variations on the Founders' Theme, 23 AM. J. JURIS. 88, 99 (1978).
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the people. Rather, the founders viewed wealth as one of the factors
that determined each state's entitlement to representation.
The counting of three fifths of the number of slaves reinforces
this conclusion. No one felt that slaves as such deserved representation,47 but the sectional interests raised by the slavery question and
the accepted emphasis on representing wealth made it difficult to argue for their total exclusion. Northern delegates opposed counting
the slaves because they feared that granting the South increased representation by virtue of the slaves would serve only to encourage the
institution.48 On the other hand, if the Union profited by taxing the
wealth of the South, that wealth required measurement with concomitant representation for the contribution.49 The Convention ultimately adopted the three-fifths formula, developed earlier in the
Resolution of April 18, 1783, governing revenue, and accepted as the
"federal ratio." 50
The theory that the framers intended the House to represent the
people cannot, account for this history. If "the people" included
slaves, the census clause would have made no exception for them. If
slaves counted as partial persons,5 I this disability had to stem from
47. Pierce Butler and Gen. Charles Pinckney, both of South Carolina, felt that blacks
should be counted equally for representation. Butler argued that their labor contributed as
much as that of freemen and that because the government "was instituted principally for the
protection of property, and was itself to be supported by property," the slaves should be
counted equally. See I RECORDS, supra.note 33, at 580-81. This proposal was defeated twice
in two days by votes of seven to three and eight to two. Id. at 580-81, 596.
Few delegates argued that the slaves should not be counted at all. Id. at 580-95. Mr.
Morris did say that Pennsylvania would never accept representation for the slaves. Id. at 593.
James Wilson suggested that the rule of representation be "expressed as to make the [slaves]
indirectly only an ingredient in the rule, by saying that they should enter into the rule of
taxation; and as representation was to be according to taxation, the end would be equally
attained." Id. at 595. Northern hostility to the provision surfaced later in the Convention.
See 2 RECORDS, supra note 33, at 220-23 (Rufus King); ROSSITER, supra note 35, at 267-68.
48. See 2 REcoRDs, supra note 33, at 220-23; C. ROSSITER, supra note 35, at 267-68. Some
of the framers feared that counting the slaves would encourage the southern states to further
increase the slave population. The national government was precluded from regulating their
importation until 1808. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
49. See 1 RECORDS, supra note 33, at 562.
Mr. King had always expected that as the Southern States are the richest, they would
not league themselves with the North unless some respect were paid to their superior
wealth. If the latter expect those preferential distinctions in commerce & other advantages which they will derive from the connection they must not expect to receive them
without allowing some advantages in return. Eleven out of 13 of the States had agreed to
consider Slaves in the apportionment of taxation; and taxation and Representation ought
to go together.
Id. (William Paterson's notes). See also 3 RECORDS, supra note 33, at 342-43 (William Davie's remarks in the North Carolina Convention regarding the three-fifths formula).
50. Farrand argues that little debate on the issue of counting slaves actually took place
because of the connection to taxation and the accepted ratio. M. FARRAND, supra note 35, at
108-09. But sees. LYND, CLASS CONFLICT, SLAVERY, AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 156-83 (1967). Lynd claims that slavery was the underlying cause of the sectionalism
apparent in every aspect of the convention and that the three-fifths compromise was much
more complex than Farrand asserts.
51. See TuE FEDERALIST No. 54 (J. Madison) at 369 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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their perceived racial inferiority or their condition of servitude. Yet
the census clause plainly required counting free blacks and whites
bound to service for a term of years. Only when viewed as a political
compromise to the property interests of the southern states does the
three-fifths compromise comport with the rest of the census clause.
This view leaves little room for direct representation of the people. 52
2. Measuring the Rights of States to Representation

If the framers intended to apportion representatives among the
states, why did they provide that a state's representation would vary
with the number of persons inhabiting its territory? The preceding
analysis suggests that the founders chose population as the best practical measure of each state's entitlement to representation. Population obviously satisfied the interests of the larger states in
proportional representation. Population further appealed to the
framers as the most practical measure of wealth available. 53 Indeed,
population may well have offered the only feasible method of measuring wealth,54 and the opposition to relying on population largely
concerned its accuracy as a reflection of property. 55 The Convention, moreover, made no attempt to ensure popular input into the
selection of representatives. The founders put forward no national
voting qualifications to supplant the widely varying state standards, 56 many of which included substantial property qualifications.57 This indifference to the manner by which the states chose
representatives clearly implies that the framers viewed the census of
52. Quite apart from questions about the basis of representation, it may be argued that
discouraging illegal immigration justifies excluding illegal aliens from the census, in a manner
analogous to the effort of the Northern states to discourage slavery through the three-fifths
compromise. FAIR, for example, ordinarily concerns itself with immigration reform, not rep•
resentation. Unlike the slavery case, however, individual states have little, if any, control over
illegal immigration. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (federal interest in integrated
scheme for registering aliens preempts state alien registration laws). While excluding this
group from apportionment figures may reduce its desirability as an element in the population
of a given state, the exclusion could influence immigration, if at all, only indirectly.
53. See, e.g., I RECORDS, supra note 33, at 579, (''He [Mr. Mason] urged that numbers of
inhabitants; though not always a precise standard of wealth was sufficiently so for every substantial purpose."), 587 ("Mr. Ghorum supported the propriety of establishing numbers as the
rule. He said that in Massts. estimates had been taken in the different towns. . . and it had
been found . . . that the most exact proportion prevailed between numbers & property."); A.
DEGRAZIA, PUBLIC AND REPUBLIC 95 (1951); Rossum, supra note 46, at 100.
54. See 3 REcoRDs, supra note 33, at 342 (Remarks of Mr. Davie in the North Carolina
Convention).
55. Gouverneur Morris opposed population as the basis of representation because he felt it
did not accurately reflect property, see 1 RECORDS, supra note 33, at 582. One commentator
has suggested that if the Framers could have foreseen the capability of the modem census
organization, considerable debate would have arisen about ''the value of property over numbers." A. DEGRAZIA, supra note 53, at 100.
56. See THE FEDERALIST No. 54 (J. Madison) at 369 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
51. See, e.g., H. GOSNELL, DEMOCRACY: THE THRESHOLD OF FREEDOM 36 (1948).
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persons as no more than the measure - and not the locus - of each
state's right to representation.
3. Illegal Aliens as a Measure of the States' Rights to
Representation

This Note argues that the framers intended to measure a state's
right to representation by the number of persons within its territory.
Three considerations support the conclusion that illegal aliens fall
within the category"ofpersons encompassed by this territorial view.
First, insofar as population measures material sources of representation, illegal aliens fulfill the framers' intent to reflect wealth in the
census that apportions representatives. To the extent that illegal
aliens take jobs American workers will not accept, their presence signals a welfare gain for the state's economy.58 Insofar as illegal aliens
compete with citizens in the labor market, the employed aliens contribute more to the state's economy than the unemployed citizens
they displace. Only if aliens drain state welfare budgets or send the
vast bulk of their earnings out of the state would they fail to reflect
the economic factors that the framers felt deserved representation.
In all probability, neither phenomenon reaches sufficient proportions
to negate the positive contributions of illegal aliens to local economies.59 The accumulation of wealth and the payment of taxes, as
58. ''The simplest and most abstract µ-uth about immigration - legal or otherwise - is
that it increases the supply of available labor and therefore makes labor cheaper, product
prices lower, and employment greater. In this simple view, immigration promotes profits, economic growth, and general prosperity, with possibly excessive demands for social capital formation (schools, hospitals, housing) the only cloud on this otherwise pleasing picture." Fogel,
Illegal Aliens: Economic Aspects and Public Policy Alternatives, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 63, 67
(1977). While Fogel goes on to disapprove of illegal immigration, at least during periods of
high domestic unemployment, because of its tendency to displace disadvantaged members of
the legal labor force, such distributional concerns have no relation to the Framers' desire to
represent the states on the basis of their wealth. Even if illegal aliens displace significant numbers oflegal workers - a hotly debated issue - they contribute thereby to the gross product of
the state. This suffices to bring them within the purpose of the census clause to measure a
state's entitlement to representation based on wealth.
59. "In the last few years, public and private studies have uniformly discredited the direct
drain theory. Data strongly suggest that only one to four percent of undocumented Mexicans
take advantage of public social services such as welfare, unemployment benefits, food stamps,
AFDC benefits and the like; that eight to ten percent actually receive "free" medical services;
that about seventy percent pay Social Security and income taxes; that the majority do not file
for an income tax refund; that all contribute to sales taxes; and that at least some contribute to
property taxes. In terms of tax dollars paid versus social services consumed, undocumented
Mexicans are overwhelmingly in the black." Lopez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In
Search ofa Just Immigration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REv. 615, 636-37 (1981) (footnotes
omitted). While undocumented aliens surely send a significant portion of their earnings out of
the United States, two considerations prevent this fact from eroding the utility of illegal aliens
as indicators of a state's wealth. First, as a matter of economic theory, illegal aliens will find
employment only on terms mutually beneficial to themselves and to an employer. The salary
agreed upon increases the utility of both parties. Consequently, even if all the money paid to
illegal aliens were sent to other countries, never to return, illegal aliens would still reflect a
positive contribution to the wealth of the state, because the value of their services exceeds the
value of their wages. Second, a significant portion of an illegal alien's income must be spent in

1354

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 80:1342

reflected by the measurement of population, constitute the attributes
of a state that the framers meant to represent. 60
Second, the specific exceptions contained in the census clause for
Indians not taxed and slaves support, by contrast, the case for counting illegal aliens. That the framers felt compelled to modify the
"persons" language to ensure special treatment for slaves - a class
possessed of "no rights which the white man was bound to respect" 61
- suggests an extremely comprehensive reading of the persons included. Surely illegal aliens, possessed of some legal rights, 62 reflect
a state's entitlement to representation to a considerably greater
degree.
The exception for Indians not taxed makes this point still clearer.
Legally, Indian tribes were "distinct political communities," analogous to foreign nations, over which the states enjoyed no jurisdiction. 63 The framers excepted Indians within these communities
because the state had no power to tax Indians living outside the territory over which it exercised jurisdiction. The exclusion in the census
clause reflects the territorial model of apportionment; those outside
the state's jurisdiction do not increase its entitlement to
representation.
When an Indian left his tribe, however, he became subject to the
state's jurisdiction and thus included in census counts relied on for
apportioning representatives. 64 This result held even for an Indian
who did not qualify as a citizen under the fourteenth amendment. 65
the state, simply to provide for necessities in a market with a much higher real price scale than
that of the market to which earnings are transmitted. Dollars spent in aliens' home countries,
moreover, to a large extent eventually return as purchases of United States exports.
60. See notes 40-46 and accompanying text,,ru_pra.
61. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856).
62. See notes 23-24, supra.
63. See Elks v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99-100 (1884):
The Indian tribes, being within the territorial limits of the United States, were not, strictly
speaking, foreign States; but they were alien nations, distinct political communities, with
whom tlie United States might and habitually did deal, as they thought fit, either through
treaties made by the President and Senate, or through acts of Congress in the ordinary
forms of legislation. The members of those tribes owed immediate allegiance to their
several tribes, and were not part of the people of the United States. . . . Indians and
their property, exempt from taxation by treaty or statute of the United States, could not be
taxed by any State.
See also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I, 17 (1831) (opinion of Marshall, C.J.).
64. See I 12 U.S. at 111. Under Nebraska law, as a resident, Elk was subject to taxation,
was a member of the militia, and "he is counted in eve,y a_p_porlionmenl ofrepresentation in the
legislature; the requirement of [Nebraska's] Constitution being, that 'the legislature shall apportion the Senators and Representatives according to the number of inhabitants, excluding
Indians not taxed and soldiers and officers of the United i,tates army.'" 112 U.S. at 11 I,
quoting NEB. CONST. art. 3, § I (emphasis added). While this is the Nebraska Constitution, its
similarity to the U.S. Constitution is obvious. In any event, Elk, being subject to state taxation,
would also be counted for apportionment under the U.S. Constitution.
65. Elk argued that he was covered under section I, which says, ''[a/II _persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
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Thus, the legal status of an inhabitant does not affect his inclusion in
the census, so long as he is subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the
state.
The final consideration suggesting the similarity of illegal aliens
and the "persons" who measure a state's right to representation concerns the treatment of legal aliens under the original census clause.
The framers, as evidenced by the citizenship requirements for the
president, senators, and representatives, 66 were not unaware of distinctions between aliens and citizens. Many of them shared xenophobic prejudices as strong as any prevalent today. 67 Had the
founders intended to exclude aliens from the census, they would
have done so affirmatively. In fact, aliens were routinely counted in
the census, and generally enjoyed considerably broader political
rights than they do today. 6 8
By every test except legality, then, undocumented aliens conform
to the criteria envisioned by the framers for inclusion in the census.
While we will never know if the framers would have considered legality relevant, much less essential, for inclusion in the census, that
distinction by itself justifies excluding illegal aliens only when coupled with the complete approval of the dangerous and implausible
outlaw approach.
C. The Fourteenth Amendment
The principles underlying the census clause of the fourteenth
amendment differ little from those underlying the original clause.
The framers of the amendment remained primarily concerned with
allocating representation among the states and the language chosen
United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ I (emphasis
added). The majority interpreted the clause as conferring citizenship by birth or naturalization
only. Since Indians born in tribes were not subject to United States jurisdiction at the time of
their birth, they could not achieve citizenship in this way but had to comply with formal procedures of naturalization dictated by particular treaty or statute. 112 U.S. at 103. Justice
Harlan, dissenting, cited congressional debates in support of his view that the phrase, "and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof," was intended to confer citizenship on any Indian who left
his tribe, regardless of treaty or naturalization procedures. 112 U.S. at 117-23. Congress considered adding "Indians not taxed" after "subject to the jurisdiction thereof' in the citizenship
clause, but decided that the meaning might be confused, resulting in an exclusion of the poor,
and that the language chosen would include Indians who had left the tribe anyway. 112 U.S.
at 117-18.
66. Representatives must have attained citizenship status at least seven years prior to being
elected. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cL 2. Senators must have attained citizenship status at least
nine years prior to election. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3. The President must be a naturally
born citizen. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
61. See THE FOUNDERS OF THE REPUBLIC ON IMMIGRATION, NATURALIZATION, AND
ALIENS (M. Grant & C. Davison eds. 1928) (collection of correspondence and writings on the
subject of aliens).
68. See Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right To Vote?, 15 MICH. L.
REv. 1092, 1094 (1977). Rosberg points out that citizenship at that time was not a definition of
voter and that in many situations aliens could vote while citizens could not. Id.
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reflects the intent to include aliens. 69
During the debates on the amendment, the thirty-ninth Congress
actually considered whether to count citizens, persons, or voters.70
Since political equality would replace the three-fifths ratio, it became
apparent that the Civil War would result in increased representation
for the South in the House.71 Northern Congressmen sought a
formula for apportionment that would avoid this outcome.72 Initially, they proposed that the census count only "qualified electors."73 They rejected this idea when the New England states
discovered that they would lose, and the Western territories gain,
representation using voters as the basis for apportionment.74 A later
version proposed counting citizens but provided that the freed slaves,
if denied political rights, could be excluded from the figures determining the state's share of representatives.75 Eventually, Congress
changed "citizens" in this version to "persons" due to fear that some
of the large states with a number of aliens would reject the amendment because it would decrease their representation.76 The provision enacted used ''whole number of persons" but added a clause
that would enable Congress to reduce the representation for any
69. See text at notes 33-52 supra, and at note 76 infra.
10. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 353-59 (1866); James, The Framing oj' the
Fourteenth Amendment, 31 ILL. STUD. Soc. Sci. 3, 21-23, 59-60 (1956).
71. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 70, at 357; James, supra note 70 at 21-22. The estimates at
the time were that the South would gain by at least fifteen representatives and the Republicans, then in control, were concerned that the Democrats would gain a majority as a result of
the South's increased representation. If the freed slaves were counted but not allowed to vote
in the South, southern voters would have substantially more voting power than their northern
counterparts. "To avoid this or prevent its adverse effect on the Republican party was a practical problem having nothing to do with doctrinaire concepts of universal suffrage." Id. at 22.
72. James, supra note 70, at 21-22.
73. Congress believed that the South would not allow the blacks to vote and that an
enumeration based on voters would avoid the result of increased representation. If the South
did allow the blacks the franchise, it was anticipated that they would vote Republican and the
problem of losing power to the Democrats would be solved. Id.
74. These figures illustrate the point:
Citizens
Massachusetts
Indiana

1,221,432
1,328,710

Voters
227,429
316,824
314,369

358,110
California
Id. at 23, 56
75. Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, counting
the whole number of citizens of the United States; provided that whenever in any State
civil or political rights or privileges shall be denied or abridged on account of race or
color, all persons of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis of representation
or taxation.
Id. at 57 (footnote omitted).
16. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 70, at 359 (remarks of Mr. Conkling); James, supra note
70, at 59. James also points out that some states allowed aliens to vote and the framers felt it
necessary to include them in the provision. Id. at 195-96.
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state denying the franchise to male citizens more than twenty-one
years old.77
This history further supports the territorial model and renders
less likely any constitutional purpose to represent the people in the
House. The formula chosen emerged from a balancing of state, not
individual, interests. The provision for excluding even citizens from
the census to punish states for failing to extend the franchise reinforces this conclusion.78 And the specific intention to include aliens
as persons strengthens the case for viewing illegal aliens as legitimate
additions to a state's right to representation.
The background of the original census clause and of the fourteenth amendment suggests that the framers chose the word "person" in each instance to include everyone within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States. Total population measured the relative wealth of the states and apportioned representation accordingly. Given these purposes, little reason exists to believe that the
framers would have excluded illegal aliens. As a group they contribute through labor and taxes and in this respect cannot be distinguished from those counted. As the framers concerned themselves
primarily with allocating representation among the states based on
contribution, illegal aliens would have provided as adequate a measure as anyone else.
II.

REPRESENTATION

The first Part of this Note has argued that the language and intent of the census clause compel counting illegal aliens in the decennial census. Contemporary notions of equality in representation,
however, might justify another interpretation, especially for those
who find the census clause ambiguous in spite of the preceding analysis.79 The plaintiffs in FAIR v. Klutznick argued that inclusion of
77. But when the ri~t to vote at any election . . . is denied . . · . or in any way abridged,
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to
the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 2.
78. See note 77 supra. But see Saunders v. Wilkins, 152 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 328 U.S. 870 (1946), which says that the provision was never actually used to reduce
representation.
79. For an interesting article on constitutional interpretation, see Sandalow, Constitutional
Interpretation, 19 MlcH. L. REv. 1033 (1981). Sandalow argues for a realistic view of interpretation and against the idea of a "core" meaning or an answer derived from the framers' intent.
The Constitution is read in light of contemporary values and it has been read "so that the
circumstances and values of the present generation might be given expression in constitutional
law." Id. at 1051. The limitation on interpretation derives from the fact that constitutional
growth is incremental and in this respect the intent of the framers, language of the document,
and history are all relevant to current inquiry. Id. at 1063, 1068-72. The past, however, provides only guidance - not the answer. Id.
For other background on constitutional interpretation, see, e.g., DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); Hurst, The Role oJ History, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME
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illegal aliens would contravene the Constitution's principle of "one
person, one vote," by diluting the voting power of citizens in states
without significant illegal populations. 80 The Supreme Court has
held that this principle applies to congressional districting within
states under the mandate of article I, section 2, and to the apportionment of state legislatures under the equ!ll protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 81 The contention that this principle requires
excluding illegal aliens from the census depends on the subsidiary
claims that it applies to interstate as well as intrastate apportionment, and that illegal aliens do not belong in the category of persons
entitled to political representation, and thus to the protection of the
principle. While superficially plausible, neither claim survives close
inspection.
A. Interstate Application of "One Person, One Vote"

In Wesberry v. Sanders, 82 the Supreme Court ruled that article I,
section 2's provision that representatives be chosen "by the People of
the several States" "means that as nearly as is practicable one man's
vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's."83 The Court reached this result over the vigorous dissent of
Justice Harlan, who argued that the Constitution apportioned representatives among the states and conferred on each state the right to
select its representatives as it chooses. 84 Harlan pointed to the three.fifths compromise and the guarantee of at least one representative
for each state as evidence that the framers did not intend to require
that each representative represent approximately the same number
of voters or inhabitants. The majority did not address these objections, but might have offered the distinction between interstate and
LAW 55 (E. Cahn ed. 1954); Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses ofHistory in Constitutional
Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502 (1964): Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971).
80. See Brief for Appellants, FAIR v. Klutznick, supra note 9, at 16-18.
81. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). The Wesberry Court relied on the language of
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. I ("The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second year by the People of the several States."), For decisions applying the one
person, one vote standard to state apportionment schemes, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964) and companion cases: WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Maryland
Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678
(1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of
Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
There has been a great deal written about the apportionment decisions. For a small sam•
piing, see R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND PouTICS (1968); w. ELLIOT, THE RISE OF GUARDIAN DEMOCRACY (1974); Auerbach, The
Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote- One Vote, One Value, 1964 SUP. CT. Rav. I;
Rossum, supra note 46; Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Righi" to Vole, and the
Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 33.
82. 376 U.S. I (1964).
83. 376 U.S. at 7-8.
84. 376 U.S. at 20-50 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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intrastate apportionment to explain the inconsistency between the
formula for allocating representatives among the states and the one
person, one vote precept.
The Court later held that the states could not adopt the system of
representation adopted in the Great Compromise without violating
this principle. In Reynolds v. Sims, 85 the Court ruled that a legislative apportionment scheme providing for a geographic allocation of
State Senators and a popular allocation of State Representatives violated the equal protection clause's guarantee of equality in voting
power. Reynolds and its progeny make clear that unless some unidentified distinction exists between the standard set by article I, section 2, and that set by the fourteenth amendment, the federal system
would fail the one person, one vote test if it applied. In the light of
this failure, the Court's consistent distinction between the geographic
allocation of representatives and senators required by the federal
Constitution but forbidden to the states unmistakably indicates that
the Wesberry and Reynolds test does not apply to interstate
apportionment.
This conclusion reflects the genesis of the federal system in a
compromise agreed to by sovereign states. 86 These "unique historical circumstances" 87 justify a different approach to interstate apportionment. The specificity with which the Constitution disdains the
equal voting power principle - in the guarantee of one representative to each state, in the Senate, and in the Electoral College88 confirms that the distribution of representation among the states
should conform to the principles of federalism over the principle of
equality. Those principles require counting illegal aliens in the
census. 89

B. Population as the Standardfor Measuring Equality
of Voting Power

Assuming for the purposes of argument that the one person, one
vote standard applies to interstate apportionment, inclusion of illegal
aliens in the census would contravene it only if voters or citizens,
rather than persons, measured the entitlement of a state to representation. A good deal of confusion, however, surrounds the question
of whether representation under this standard should correspond to
total population, number of citizens, or number of voters. This confusion appears to result from imprecise and undifferentiated refer85. 377 U.S. 533, 571-77 (1964).
86. 377 U.S. at 574-75.
87. 377 U.S. at 574.
88. See, e.g., 376 U.S. at 28-29 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (one representative per state); Gray
v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 378 (1963) (Electoral College).
89. See notes 33-52 and accompanying text, supra.
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ences to the related but distinct concepts of citizenship,
representation, and suffrage. The Court's opinion in Reynolds v.
Sims offers an excellent example. The Court held that "t4e seats in
both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on
a population basis" because "an individual's right to vote for state
legislators is unconstitutionally infringed when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens living
in other parts of the State." 90 The indiscriminate use of such terms
as population, voters, and citizens creates significant ambiguity in
the meaning of the one person, one vote epigram.
The census clause does little to resolve this confusion because it
speaks only of the very formal process of allocating representatives
for a certain number of people. Theoretically, the representative
represents each person counted, even those not entitled to vote. 91
The framers addressed only the issue of counting in article I, section
2, and left regulation of voting entirely to the states. 92 At that time
significant distinctions separated the related concepts of citizenship,
representation, and suffrage. Only a small portion of the population
could vote,93 but the census counted everyone for the purpose of
congressional representation. 94 Citizenship did not guarantee suffrage,95 and states that required property ownership as a prerequisite
to voting often did not require citizenship. 96 Often, alien property
owners enjoyed the franchise while certain citizens did not. 97
The obscurity of article I, section 2, and the Court's apportionment decision leaves .some scope for the argument that members of
Congress represent voters, rather than population. This view would
require excluding illegal aliens from the census because including
them would distort the equality of representation among voters.
While no clear consensus has emerged concerning the role of the
90. 377 U.S. at 568.
91. This theory is referred to as virtual representation. Although rejected as practiced in
England, the concept underlies much of what was done by the framers in the area of representation. See G. Woon, REPRESENTATION AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1969).
92. It is a fundamental principle of the proposed Constitution, that the aggregate
number of representatives allotted to the several States is to be determined by a federal
rule, founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants, so the right of choosing this allotted number in each state is to be exercised by such part of the inhabitants as the State
itself may designate.
THE FEDERALIST, No. 54 (J. Madison) 369 (J. Cook ed. 1961). See also notes 74, 76 supra.
93. See H. GOSNELL, DEMOCRACY: THE THRESHOLD OF FREEDOM 36 (1948) (One half of
the male population was disenfranchised by property qualifications and as a result it is estimated that only three percent of the population voted in the first election under the
Constitution).
94. Everyone except those specifically excluded was counted. See text at notes 66-68 supra.
95. See note 14supra (comparing citizen and voter population); Rosberg, supra note 68 (on
voting rights of aliens). See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (granting women the vote).
96. See Rosberg, supra note 68, at 1094.
91. Id. at 1093-94.
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representative in the United States,98 support does exist for viewing
voters and not people as the represented. The broad trend toward
expanding the franchise99 directs attention to voting rather than citizenship or population. By viewing the relationship between representative and represented in delegate terms, the voter becomes the
central figure. From this position it takes only a small step to equate
representation with voting. 100 Universal suffrage, designed to make
the representative more accountable to the constituency, begins to
dominate and color thinking about the constituency itself. 101 Because only citizens may vote, citizenship in turn becomes an additional qualification for representation. 102 The emphasis in the
apportionment decisions on the right to vote and the right to have
each vote counted equally casts doubt on the right of nonvoters to
representation.
Stronger arguments, however, support reliance on population as
the baseline for measuring equality of voting power. First, the
Court's decisions clearly indicate the constitutionality of the population standard. The Court has held that for apportionment of state
legislatures, the state, in resolving a political issue, enjoys the discretion to rely on total population, citizen population, 103 or registered
98. The thorough treatment of this topic would exceed the scope of this Note. See generally A. BIRCK, REPRESENTATION (1971); H. GOSNELL, supra note 93, at 124-42; H. PITKIN,
THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967); REPRESENTATION (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds.
1968). In Political Representation: An Overview, in REPRESENTATION, id. at 12-13, Pennock
divides the trustee/delegate problem into four propositions:
1. Representatives act in support of constituency desires.
2. Representatives act in support of what they believe is in the best interest of the
constituency.
3. Representatives act in support of national desires.
4. Representatives act in support of national interest.
Pennock concludes that each theory operates at different times and that the representative is
always balancing the various concerns.
99. See U.S. CONST. amend XV (extending the franchise to black males); U.S. CONST.
amend XIX (extending the franchise to women); U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXIV (eliminating the
poll tax); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (lowering the voting age to eighteen).
100. q: Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1963):
But representative government is in essence self-government through the medium of
elected representatives of the people, and each and every citizen has an inalienable right
to full and effective participation in the political processes of his State's legislative bodies.
Most citizens can achieve this participation only as qualified voters through the election of
legislators to represent them.
101. See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92-96 (1966); J. Ross, ELECTIONS AND ELECTORS 101 (1955) (''Universal suffrage necessarily treats every elector as precisely equal to every
other elector: it can take account neither of differences of ability nor of differences of need.
Hence, with universal suffrage, no justification can be found for giving greater weight to one
vote than to another. The logical and inescapable consequence of this is that the ratio between
the number of electors and the number of elected should, within a given electoral system, be
everywhere the same . . . .").
.
· 102. All states require citizenship for voting. Arkansas was the last state to eliminate alien
suffrage and did so in 1926. Rosberg, supra note 68, at 1100.
103. See WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964).
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voter population. 104 So long as the state does not use one of these
standards to "perpetuate underrepresentation of groups constitutionally entitled to participate in the electoral process," 105 it may constitutionally adopt any of them. The rationale for protecting only those
entitled to participate suggests counting only voters or citizens, 106 but
the Court explicitly held that the population standard fulfilled the
one person, one vote criterion. 107 Moreover, in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 108 the Court expressed its doubt that the Constitution permits
federal congressional districting on any basis other than total population. "There may be a question whether distribution of congressional seats except according to total population can ever be
permissible under Art. I, § 2." 109 Given that article I, section 2, and
not the fourteenth amendment, imposes the one person, one vote
standard on apportionment of representatives, 110 reliance on total
population is surely permitted and perhaps required by the
Constitution.
Second, any nonpopulation standard faces considerable difficulty
in discovering a test to exclude illegal aliens without also excluding
persons whom the census has always counted. illegal aliens may not
vote, but neither may many other individuals who surely qualify as
"persons." Examples include children, legal aliens, 111 and felons. 112
If the nonpopulation standard seeks to count only those entitled to
representation, difficulties persist. Children, if citizens, perhaps have
some claim to representation because they may vote in the future.
Felons, on the other hand, while citizens, have permanently lost the
right to vote. Resident aliens are not citizens and may not vote, but
the history of the fourteenth amendment clearly reveals the intention
104. See Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91-97 (1966). The Court in Burns v. Richardson sought to limit its holding, that registered voter population was acceptable, to the facts of

that case. The Court said that the use of registered voters was permissible because the resulting apportionment was substantially the same as it would have been using citizen population.
384 U.S. at 96-97. Citizens population figures were, however, unavailable and it is unclear
how much leeway a state might have in showing that its system produced an apportionment
that was substantially the same as it would be using citizen population.
105. 384 U.S. at 92.
106. See 384 U.S. at 73; cases cited in note 81 supra; note 102 supra.
107. See 384 U.S. at 92; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
108. 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
109. 394 U.S. at 534. J.nKirkpatrick, the Court expressly left open the question of whether
a state could apportion its congressional districts using something other than total population.
Even if states were allowed to use an alternate base in districting, under the present system
they would still be allocated representatives based on the total population of the state.
110. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
111. See note 102supra.
112. By implication, the fourteenth amendment permits states to disenfranchise felons.
See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (state constitutional and statutory provisions
disenfranchising convicted felons are not inconsistent with equal protection); note 77, supra.
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to include them. 113 Neither the right to participate, nor the right to
representation, distinguishes illegal aliens from groups well within
the ambit of the census clause.
The only viable distinction between illegal aliens and groups
such as felons and resident aliens concerns the illegality of their
physical presence. This outlaw approach deserves no greater deference in the context of representation than it merits in interpreting the
language of the census clause. If anything, the dangers of defining
fundamental rights by reference to citizenship appear more clearly
here, where reliance on such a standard would permit the government to manipulate the political process by altering the definition of
citizen.
Several conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, plaintiffs
like FAIR who seek to exclude illegal aliens from the census to avoid
the dilution of their voting power should not prevail. The one person, one vote principle does not apply to interstate apportionment.
If it did, allocation of representatives based on total population, legal
and illegal, is constitutionally invulnerable. Second, should Congress act to change the basis of interstate apportionment the defenders of such a plan could not justify its deviation from the language
and intent of the census clause by raising equality of voting power as
a competing constitutional principle. Because population-based apportionment fully satisfies the equality principle, and the census
clause speaks in terms of "persons" rather than citizens or voters,
such a plan should not survive judicial scrutiny.
This legal analysis may succeed in establishing that the Constitution does not forbid dilution of citizens' voting power by counting
illegal aliens in the census. This, of itself, does little to dispel the
doubts of those deeply committed to the contemporary egalitarian
model of representation. Appeals to the intentions of the framers
and the decisions of the courts do not address the normative beliefs
behind that model. Yet the facts that counting illegal aliens may
serve purposes of representation, such as the maintenance of federalism, that extend beyond rigid adherence to the egalitarian formula,
that counting other individuals such as resident aliens routinely
leads to a similar distortion, and that the ultimate dilution will prove
relatively minor, may successfully countervail these concerns even
on the level of political theory. An opposite conclusion, in any
event, ought to be incorporated into constitutional law by direct
amendment rather than interpretation. While the Constitution may
retain the capacity for organic growth in response to contemporary
political values, a decision in tension if not at odds with the use of
"persons" in the constitutional language and the framers' intent to
represent the states seems beyond the scope of justifiable "growth."
113. See text at note 76 supra.
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To reach for such a result when contemporary views of representation are uncertain and perhaps inconsistent would give up some of
the document's enduring stability in exchange for a doubtful concession to modem values.

Ill.

THE

Locus

OF DECISION

This Note has advanced the thesis that the census clause requires
including illegal aliens in the population count that governs the apportionment of representatives. Before reaching such a decision on
the merits, a court adjudicating any challenges to the operation of
the census must also decide whether the issue admits of judicial resolution. This Part argues that consideration of the practical difficulties with counting illegal aliens, the judicial doctrines of standing
and political questions, and the arguments for judicial review supports the conclusion that the courts should not hesitate to dispense
justice on the merits.
A. Practical Considerations

A number of practical concerns bearing on the decision whether
to count illegal aliens suggest that Congress should decide the question. The most obvious question is whether the Census Bureau
could exclude this population from the figures if instructed to do so.
Given the enormous task of counting the population, it may be unreasonable to require that the Bureau refrain from counting a specific portion of the population, especially when that population is
unwilling to identify itself. Beyond announcements that illegal
aliens should not answer questionnaires, effective and workable procedures are hard to imagine. 114
FAIR suggested that the Census Bureau subtract estimates of the
illegal alien population from total population figures. 115 The main
problem with this solution is that there is no assurance that the total
population counted includes all, or even most, of the illegal aliens. 116
If it does not, then the Bureau would be subtracting from citizen
population. The second problem is that estimates of the illegal alien
population range from three to twelve million. 117 In short, no one
knows how many there are to subtract.
114. See Note, supra note 1, at 265 ("The issue of whether to adjust data in ways not
known to improve accuracy is peculiarly one for Congress.").
115. See FAIR v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564, 575.
116. For some of the problems with attempting to count illegal aliens separately, see FAIR
v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. at 568. The same factors that would make separate counts for aliens
and citizens problematic also operate on the Census as presently conducted. Illegal residents
tend to shun any contact with government agents that might result in their discovery and
deportation. Consequently, the Census probably undercounts the alien population to a very
significant extent.
117. See note 13 supra.
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A more technical problem exists in determining the duration of
undocumented status. There are a number of statutory provisions
that make undocumented aliens meeting certain conditions ineligible
for deportation. 118 More fundamentally, and more prevalently,
many undocumented aliens simply are not deported. 119 Absent
some official determination of status, an undocumented alien presumably retains that status despite changing circumstances. Nevertheless, at some point the alien has become a permanent inhabitant.
In this situation, illegal entry seems a poor reason for excluding such
a person from the census.
These practical problems are more properly within the purview
of Congress, which can investigate the capabilities of the Census Bureau and gather information from other appropriate sources. But the
decision also involves interpreting the phrase ''whole number of persons" used in the census clause. Congress is fully capable of interpreting the Constitution and, in this case as in countless others, must
do so to carry out its functions. 120 Such a congressional determination, however, presents the question whether the Supreme Court
should review this particular decision.
B. Standing To Sue

The availability of judicial review may tum on who brings suit.
To establish standing in constitutional actions, a plaintiff must
demonstrate, at- a minimum, "that he personally has suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct," that the injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action,"
and that the injury "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision."121 The rationale for the standing requirement concerns the
vigor with which a plaintiff will litigate his suit. 122 Fear that a plaintiff without the incentive of an actual injury will prosecute his action
118. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(l) (1976) (Attorney General can suspend deportation of
an alien, who has resided here seven years or more and is of good moral character, if deportation would result in hardship to him or to his spouse, parent, or child who are lawful residents); 8 U.S.C. § 1254(b) (1976) (Attorney General can suspend deportation for an alien who
has served 24 months or more in active duty in the Armed Forces).
119. See note 13 supra.
120. Congress considered whether to count aliens from 1929 until 1947 and recently discussed counting illegal aliens. See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text. The question concerning illegal aliens has been temporarily settled by inaction but, in view of the vote in the
House on the McDade Amendment, there appears to be substantial support for exclusion and
the issue will undoubtedly be raised again. Congress then will confront once more the constitutionality of any exclusion.
121. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 4103, 4105 (1982) (citations omitted).
122. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) ("Have the appellants alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions? This is the gist of the question of standing.").
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indifferently, thus denying the court the benefits of the adversary
process and creating res judicata difficulties for subsequent litigants,
explains the doctrine, at least in part.
Illegal aliens themselves have a poor claim to standing in a suit
challenging congressional action to exclude them from the census. 123
Organizations of individuals lack standing to oppose the current
practice of counting illegal aliens on constitutional grounds. 124 But
states that would lose representatives as a result of a congressional
exclusion surely suffer sufficient injury to maintain the needed standing.125 Tracing the injury to the challenged action and redressing it
through judicial action present few difficulties because both injury
and remedy could be identified-with reference to the system currently in use. The factual demonstration that an exclusion would
injure a state, and that a court could successfully enjoin an exclusionary system in favor of the current practice, appears imminently
feasible. With congressional seats and millions of dollars in funds at
stake, states have strong incentives to defend their interests vigorously. Consequently, both the formula and the rationale for the
standing doctrine support recognizing the standing of states to sue to
redress unconstitutional census procedures.
C. Political Questions

The political question doctrine, like that of standing to sue, preserves the courts' option to evade an unpleasant issue. Consequently, predicting whether the Court will decide an arguably
"political question" on the merits defies analytic precision. Based on
the standards for classifying a dispute as a political question, however, only a modest case can be made for deeming the exclusion of
illegal aliens from the census outside the purview of the Court.
In .Baker v. Carr, 126 Justice Brennan attempted to catalogue the
concerns that had led the Court to decline to decide certain cases
under the political question doctrine. 127 These concerns included the
123. Because illegal aliens cannot vote, whatever injury they suffer as a result of exclusion
from the census would be far more attenuated and speculative than that of the plaintiffs in
FAIR v. Klutzmi:k. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and its progeny, recognized standing
only for voters whose votes were demonstrably diluted by government policies.
124. The plaintiffs in FAIR v. Klutznick lacked standing because they failed to prove injury. The court held that because no particular plaintiff could prove that his own vote would
be denigrated by including illegal aliens, a group of persons with characteristics like those of
persons who might be injured lacked standing. 486 F. Supp. at 570-75. The court noted that
the degree of injury did not bear on the standing question; even a minute dilution of a plain•
tiff's vote would suffice to confer standing. But plaintiffs failed to establish with certainty that
any of them would suffer such a dilution. 486 F. Supp. at 573.
125. Loss of federal funds would not suffice, because such a result follows not from any
decision as to how to conduct the census itself, but from the congressional decision to follow
census data in allocating funds. 486 F. Supp. at 566 n.3, 569 n.9.
126. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
127. Prior examples of political questions include Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946)
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textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; a lack of judicial standards for
resolving the issue; the need for an extra-judicial policy determination to decide the question; whether the Court might decide the issue
without expressing disrespect for the other branches of the government; or an unusual need for the government to speak with one
voice on the question presented. 128 Deciding the constitutionality of
excluding illegal aliens from the census would not require application of any standards other than the tools of constitutional interpretation regularly relied on by the courts. Nor would the Court need
to indulge any policy preferences other than those expressed in the
Constitution. Some disrespect for the political departments of the
government inheres in any exercise of judicial review. 129 The disrespect shown by a decision to invalidate the exclusion of illegal aliens
is less than that in most cases because the Constitution, whatever its
meaning, clearly controls the scope of the census. The meaning of
(apportionment; formally overruled by Wesberry v. Sanders); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433
(1939) (validity of enactments, such as whether a constitutional amendment complies with the
time limit set for its ratification, presents a political question); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 1 (1849) (guarantee clause presents issues without manageable standards for judicial
decision-making).
128. 369 U.S. at 217. This functional approach has also been espoused by commentators.
See Frank, Political Questions, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 36 (E. Cahn ed. 1954);
Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517,
566-97 (1966). Bickel would probably have agreed with the functional approach but he
thought all decisions in the area were ultimately controlled by expediency. See Bickel, The
Supreme Court 1960 Term - Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 46, 74-79
(1961). Henkin's approach is also functional though he would discard the label of "political
question" altogether. "Would not the part of the courts in our system, the institution of judicial review, and their public and intellectual acceptance, fare better if we broke open that
package, assigned its authentic components elsewhere, and threw the package away?" Henkin,
Is There a "Political Question" .Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 625 (1976).
129. This Note will not examine whether Congress or the Court should decide the question
of counting illegal aliens within the broad framework of the pros and cons of judicial review
per se. For an overview of the controversy, see W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-35 (5th ed. 1980), and sources cited therein. The broad issue of the
propriety of judicial review is beyond the scope of this Note and for practical purposes an
academic question:
Whether the power of the Supreme Court "to outlaw as unconstitutional acts of elected
officials or of officers controlled by elected officials" was intended by the Framers or
granted by the Constitution is no longer the real issue. Rather as Dean Eugene V. Rostow
has put it, the power of judicial review "has been exercised by the Court from the beginning . . . . And it stands now, whatever the Founding Fathers may in fact have meant, as
an integral feature of the living constitution, long since established as a working part of
the democratic political life of the nation." "The weight of . . . history is evidence that
the people do expect the courts to interpret, declare, adapt, and apply these constitutional
provisions, as one of their main protections against the possibility of abuse by Presidents
and legislatures."
Choper, On The Warren Court and Judicial Review, 17 CATH. U. AM. L. REv. 20, 37 (1967)
(footnote omitted) (quoting Rostow, The .Democratic Character ofJudicial Review, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 193 (1952), and Rostow, The Supreme Court and the People's Will, 33 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 573,576,590 (1958)). This Note will discuss the pros and cons of judicial review of this
particular question within the framework of the political question doctrine and the elements
that have, in the past, led the Court to decline to hear a case.
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the Constitution, at least since Marbury v. Madison, has been "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department." 130
And, in the case of aliens and the census, Congress has repeatedly
deferred to the fear that an exclusion would contravene the census
clause. 131 Surely fulfilling a function that the legislature expects the
courts to exercise expresses no disrespect for the political departments of the national government. Nor does the apportionment of
United States representatives, as distinct from the issue of illegal immigration itself, implicate foreign relations so as to require governmental unanimity on the issue. Representation for illegal aliens
will have remote, if any, consequences for the flow of illegal
immigration.
The remaining possibility for declining to adjudicate the issue
under the political question doctrine is a "textually demonstrable
commitment" of the issue to another governmental department. Arguably, the question of whether to include illegal aliens in the population base lies within the purview of Congress. Article I, section 2,
provides that "[t]he actual Enumeration shall be made within three
Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States,
and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as
they shall by Law direct." 132 This language would appear to give
Congress wide discretion in directing the census. 133 And the results
of the census challenges in federal court support the notion that the
courts are reluctant to interfere in this area. 134 Further, section 2 of
the fourteenth amendment provides that representation shall be reduced for states that abridge voting rights for males over twenty-one
years old. A New York resident tried to enforce this provision in the
federal courts, but was denied relief. 135 Although the cases in the
lower federal courts tend to be dismissed on standing grounds rather
than disposed of as political questions, they do evince an overall discomfort on the part of the courts with these questions. 136
130. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
131. See note 4 supra.
132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
133. For a discussion of cases challenging the manner of enumeration, see Note, supra note
l; Note, The Courts and the 1980 Census Challenges: Tailoring Rights To Fit Remedies, 15 U.
MlcH. J. L. REF. 153 (1981).
134. Id.
135. See Sharrow v. Brown, 447 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 968 (1972);
Saunders v. Wilkins, 152 F.2d 235 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 870 (1945),
136. The Supreme Court has not been faced with the question of whether Congress has
binding authority to decide issues arising under the census clause. On the issue of whether to
include illegal aliens, the Court could decide (1) that it was within the prerogative of Congress,
and its decision binding on the courts, (2) that congressional prerogative only applied to some
portions of the clause, (3) that Congress had authority but had exceeded that authority, or
(4) that the clause did not confer unreviewable authority on Congress and that its decision was
acceptable (or unacceptable) on the merits.
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On the other hand, the Court has intervened in some cases characterized by stronger arguments for the legislature's prerogative. 137
The discussion of political questions in Baker v. Carr does not clarify
whether one factor alone suffices to cause the Court to deny review.138 The guarantee clause, thus far the only constitutional provision immune to judicial review,13 9 encompasses two factors: judicial
incompetence and congressional authority to decide the issue. 140
Moreover, certain language in Baker v. Carr, consistent with the
functional approach to political questions, suggests that the underlying factors rather than the clause itself have led to this result, leaving
open the possibility of future litigation under the guarantee clause. 141
Given this background, a finding that the census clause conferred
authority upon Congress may not suffice to label the issue of whether
to count illegal aliens in the census a political question.
Because the Court has not had to decide whether census clause
claims lie entirely within the purview of Congress, it is not confined
by precedent and has a number of options. 142 One such option is to
decide that only portions of the clause fall within congressional discretion. This approach would enable the Court to avoid questions of
the manner of enumeration, expressly assigned to Congress, 143 and,
at the same time, to review a congressional interpretation of the
phrase ''whole number of persons."
The constitutional language itself suggests this distinction between congressional discretion-to administer the census and discretion to count some "persons" and not others. The text commits only
the manner of enumeration, and not the persons to be enumerated,
to the prerogative of Congress. Such a distinction comports with the
federal model of the census clause defended throughout this Note,
for little likelihood exists that the states would have surrendered
their sovereignty to a national government with unfettered discretion
to manipulate the Great Compromise so precisely worked out to
137. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
138. See Scharpf, supra note 128, at 566-67. Scharpfs discussion indicates that a variety of
factors operate.
139. See Henkin, supra note 128, at 607-10.
140. See notes 127-28 supra and accompanying text. Some commentators say that the real
problem with the guarantee clause is that hearing cases under the clause would provoke a
head-on confrontation between the Court and other branches of government, see P. STRUM,
supra note 152, at 35; cf. C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 67-99 (1969) (drawing a distinction between the authority to review acts of Congress and
the authority to review acts of the states). Other commentators point out that the Court has
decided several difficult issues and this factor alone cannot explain a decision to deny relief
based on the political question doctrine. See Scharpf, supra note 128, at 566.
141. 369 U.S. at 217-18.
142. See, e.g., note 136 supra.
143. See text at notes 132-33 supra.
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overcome the profound doubts of large and small states alike. 144
Even if the Court decided that the entire clause assigns authority
to Congress, the question whether Congress has exceeded the au· thority granted remains. 145 A pure grant of authority, without more,
may not preclude judicial review. 146 In this case, the Court would
have to decide whether a decision by Congress to exclude illegal
aliens from the apportionment base went beyond the authority conferred. This approach necessarily goes to the merits of the decision.
If the word "person" is ambiguous as applied to illegal aliens, Congress could decide to exclude this group. If the word "person" is not
ambiguous and expressly includes all people within the territorial
jurisdiction of the state, as this Note argues, then Congress would
have exceeded its grant of authority. In either case, the Supreme
Court would review the decision.
D. Argumentsfor Judicial Review
Beyond the customary desire to see justice done on the merits,
two particular concerns support judicial review of any congressional
effort to exclude illegal aliens from the census. First, the census
clause establishes a system for allocating representatives among the
states. The clause amounts to an agreement among the states governing the distribution of political power among them. 147 The plan
is fundamental to the structure of the government, and should remain stable regardless of whom a transient majority would exclude
from representation. 148 Unless Congress decided to exclude aliens
from the population base, changing existing procedures, the Court
would be unlikely to interfere. The Court, however, should review
any decision to change the formula for allocating representatives
144. See notes 34-39 supra and accompanying text. By analogy, the framers were so concerned that the arrangement in the Senate not be altered that they inserted a provision insulating the scheme even from constitutional amendment. A state cannot be given less than two
senators without its consent. U.S. CONST., art. V. Surely they could not have intended that the
scheme of representation designed for the House could be altered by something less than constitutional amendment.
145. Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution
to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever
authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation,
and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.
396 U.S. at 211. See also Henkin, supra note 128, at 607-13.
146. This relates to the argument that issues involving political questions contain more
than one of the factors under consideration. See notes 138-41 supra and accompanying text.
147. See Note, .Demography and .Distrust: Constitutional Issues of the Federal Census, 94
HARV. L. REV. 841, 863 (1981).
148. Arguably, so long as the majority that chose to abandon the current practice was
elected under it, the resulting change would not abrogate the original compact agreed to by the
states. This, however, ignores the interests of minority states, which may have entered the
agreement because the Constitution guaranteed the stability of the system of allocating interstate representation.
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among the states 149 because the failure to do so would relegate the
remedy for an abuse of power to the legislative majority responsible
for it.
Second, leaving the constitutional meaning of "person" to the
discretionary definition of the legislature poses subtle but serious
risks. The Constitution speaks repeatedly in terms of people and
persons. Aside from the need for consistency, these provisions ought
not to depend on the good will of political majorities, for it is precisely against majority abuse that they were meant to guard. 150
CONCLUSION

The language and history of the census clause leave little doubt
that the framers intended to include all persons in the census that
apportions representatives. The intent to count persons reflects the
conviction that the states as political entities, rather than individuals
as citizens or voters, enjoy the right to representation in the national
legislature. This territorial model of representation, viewing persons
within the jurisdiction of the state as the measure, but not the source,
of a state's entitlement to repre~entation, requires counting illegal
aliens in the decennial census. Contemporary notions of equality in
voting rights do not conflict with, or outweigh in constitutional importance, the principles of federalism expressed in the census clause.
The courts should not hesitate to defe~d those principles.

149. See Cox, The Role ofthe Supreme Court in American Society, 50 MARQ. L. REV. 575,
579 (1967) ("One special charge of the Court· is responsibility for the framework of our
government.").
150. See text at note 31 supra. One obvious possible abuse concerns a decision by the
political branches to legalize undocumented immigration for the purpose of gaining political
advantage. So long as personhood for purposes of representation depends upon variable legal
categories rather than upon enduring constitutional standards, the temptation of this sort of
political exploitation will remain.

